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Casenotes and Statute Notes
FEDERAL COURTS-FORUM NON CONVENIENS-The Mere
Possibility of Laws in an Alternative Forum Being Less
Favorable to a Plaintiff Should Not Bar Dismissal of a Suit on
the Grounds of Forum Non Conveniens. Piper Aircraft Co. v.
Reyno, - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 252 (1981).1
On July 27, 1976, a small chartered commercial aircraft
crashed in the Scottish highlands, near the town of Talla.'
The pilot and all five passengers were killed immediately.
There were no eye-witnesses. The pilot and passengers were
Scottish subjects and residents, as were their heirs and next of
kin.'
The aircraft was operated by a Scottish air taxi service,
McDonald Aviation Ltd., which leased it from another
Scottish company, Air Navigation and Trading Co., which
owned and maintained the aircraft." The British Department
of Trade investigated the accident soon after it occurred and
Piper Aircraft Co. and Hartzell Propeller, Inc. filed separate petitions for writ of
certiorari. The Supreme Court granted these petitions and consolidated the two cases
for argument. 101 S.Ct. 1347. In Hartzell's case, the Supreme Court limited the grant
of certiorari to whether a motion to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens
must be denied whenever the law of the alternate forum is less favorable. The three
questions presented by Hartzell's petition which were not included in the grant of
certiorari were as follows: (1) whether the choice of forum of a non-resident alien
plaintiff is entitled to the same weight as that of a citizen or resident plaintiff in a
forum non conveniens inquiry; (2) whether the district court's determination that
public and private interest factors weigh in favor of dismissal on forum non con-
veniens grounds constitutes an abuse of discretion; and (3) whether a party seeking a
forum non conveniens dismissal must identify with particularity witnesses and the
substance of their testimony. Brief for Petitioner (Hartzell Propeller, Inc.) at (i),
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 102 S.Ct. 252 (1981).
' The aircraft involved was a seven-year-old twin engine Piper Aztec, model PA-
23-250. Id. at 2. It was registered in Great Britain and bore British registration mark
G-AYSF. Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 479 F. Supp. 727, 729 (M.D. Pa. 1979).
Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 479 F. Supp. at 730.
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 102 S.Ct. 252, 257 (1981).
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suggested in a preliminary report that mechanical failure in
the plane or propeller was responsible for the crash.' This
report was reviewed by a British Review Board in an
adversary proceeding attended by all interested parties.' The
Review Board found that the evidence of mechanical failure
was inadequate to establish such failure as the cause of the
accident and indicated that pilot error may have been a
contributing cause. Gaynell Reyno,5 a California resident, was
appointed administratrix of the estates of the five deceased
passengers, and on July 27, 1977, commenced a wrongful
death and survivor action on their behalf in the Superior
Court of California." Reyno sued Piper Aircraft Company
("Piper"), a Pennsylvania corporation which manufactured
the plane, and Hartzell Propeller, Inc. ("Hartzell"), an Ohio
corporation which manufactured the propellers, under
theories of strict liability and negligence. 10 Scottish law does
6 Id. The wreckage was retained by the British Department of Trade and Industry.
Piper, 429 F. Supp. at 730. The British Department of Trade and Industry has the
general duty of organizing, carrying out and encouraging measures for the design,
development and production of civil aircraft, promoting safety and efficiency in their
use, and researching questions relating to air navigation. Civil Aviation Act 1949, § 1
(I).
6 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 102 S.Ct. 252, 257 (1981). In the United Kingdom,
any person notified that his reputation is likely to be adversely affected by an
Inspector's investigation report of an aviation accident may obtain a review of the
findings which attribute any degree of blame to him. Civil Aviation (Investigation of
Accidents) Regulations 1969, reg. 13 (1), (2). The review board consists of a person
appointed by the Lord Chancellor, sitting with such technical advisors, if any, as may
be appointed. Id. In this case, the Review Board studied the findings of the
Investigator's report at Hartzell's request. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 102 S.Ct. at
257.
7 Talla is located in a mountainous region of Scotland noted for severe air
turbulence known as "mountain waves." The Review Board found that the pilot was
flying at a much lower altitude than required by his company's regulations concerning
minimum altitude in such areas. Brief for Petitioner at 3, n.4, Piper Aircraft Co. v.
Reyno, 102 S.Ct. 252 (1981).
8 Reyno was a legal secretary to the attorney who instituted this suit. She is not
related to any of the decedents or their survivors. Piper Aircraft, 102 S.Ct. at 257.
' Scottish law would not permit such a claim by the personal representative of the
estate of a decedent. It allows wrongful death actions only when brought by a relative
of the decedent and limits recovery to "loss of support and society." Piper Aircraft,
102 S.Ct. at 257.
1o The manufacturer of the plane's engine, Avco-Lycoming, Inc., was also named as
a defendant but was later dismissed by stipulation of the parties. Reyno v. Piper
Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d. 149, 154 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 102 S:Ct. 252 (1981).
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not recognize strict liability in tort, and Reyno admittedly
filed the action in the United States because its laws are more
favorable to her position. 1
The pilot was not a party to the suit filed by Reyno. The
survivors of the five deceased passengers brought a separate
suit in the United Kingdom against the pilot's estate, Air
Navigation, and McDonald Aviation. 2 The pilot's estate
instituted a suit in the United Kingdom against Piper,
Hartzell, Air Navigation and McDonald Aviation. 3
In August of 1977, on motion by defendants, 4 Reyno's
action was removed to the United States District Court for
the Central District of California.15 Subsequently, the District
Court transferred the action to the Middle District of
Pennsylvania pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).' e
After the transfer, Hartzell moved to dismiss the case on
the ground of forum non conveniens contending that the case
should be heard in Scotland. 7 Piper filed a similar motion. 8
" Piper Aircraft, 102 S.Ct. at 257.
Is Id.
Is Id. at 257 n.2.
"1 Hartzell did not join in the petition for removal, which was made by Piper and
Avco-Lycoming, Inc. Avco was later dismissed from the suit. See supra note 6.
Is The action was removed on the basis of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a) (1976), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976). Brief for Petitioner (Piper
Aircraft) at 3, Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 102 S. Ct. 252 (1981).
16 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976) provides: "For the convenience of the parties and
witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to
any other district or division where it might have been brought."
Hartzell moved for dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction or in the alternative
for transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Piper joined in the motion to transfer.
Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 479 F. Supp. at 729. The District Court granted Piper's
motion to transfer and Hartzell's motion to quash service for lack of personal
jurisdiction. Id. The District Court did not dismiss the action as to Hartzell because
valid service could be made on Hartzell in Pennsylvania. Id. Hartzell was validly
served with process in Pennsylvania after the transfer. Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co.,
630 F.2d at 155.
The significance of the quashing of service on Hartzell and the transferring of the
action as to Piper becomes apparent when determining which choice-of-law rules
apply to each defendant under Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964) and
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Manuf., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co.,
479 F. Supp. at 728-29. See infra note 135.
'7 Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d at 155. The doctrine of forum non
conveniens allows a court to refuse jurisdiction even if it is authorized by a general
venue statute when it appears the action would more appropriately be tried
elsewhere. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
19831
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
The District Court granted both motions in October, 1979.19
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit reversed the District Court and remanded the
action.2 0 The Supreme Court of the United States granted
certiorari to resolve the questions raised as to the proper
application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.2 ' Held,
reversed: The mere possibility of laws in an alternative forum
being less favorable to a Plaintiff should not bar dismissal of a
suit on the grounds of forum non conveniens. Piper Aircraft
Co. v. Reyno, - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 252 (1981).
I. FORUM NON CONVENIENS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
In 1947, in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert22 and Koster v. (Ameri-
can) Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co.,23 the United States
Supreme Court firmly established and set the standards for
the power of a federal district court to dismiss an action on
the ground of forum non conveniens.2 4 The doctrine of forum
non conveniens, however, was not original. Although its ori-
gins are somewhat uncertain, the doctrine, which allows a
court to decline to exercise jurisdiction where the action
would more appropriately be tried elsewhere, is believed to
have originated in Scotland.2 In the United States, the courts
' Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d at 155.
" Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 479 F. Supp. 727 (M.D. Pa. 1979). The District
Court ordered that the action "be dismissed on the conditions that Defendants waive
any defense that they might have relating to any statute of limitations that did not
exist prior to the initiation of this suit and that they abide by their stipulation to
submit to the jurisdiction of the Scottish courts." Id. at 738.
"0 Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d 149 (3rd Cir. 1980). See supra notes 132-
137 and accompanying text.
" 101 S.Ct. 1346 (1981). Piper Aircraft Co. and Hartzell Propeller, Inc. both
submitted petitions for certiorari. The Supreme Court consolidated the two cases for
argument.
330 U.S. 501 (1947).
" Id. at 518.
See Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d 149, 157 (3rd Cir. 1980); Braucher,
The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 HARV. L. REv. 908, 927 (1947).
Is The doctrine apparently arose in Scotland as a reaction against the process
known as arrestment ad fundandum jurisdictionem, whereby "[t]he arrestment or
attachment in Scotland of the goods of A in the hands of B suffice[d] to found [sic]
jurisdiction against A, although he is not on any other ground subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the courts of Scotland." A. Gibb, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF JURISDICTION
CASENOTES AND STATUTE NOTES
of several states had long been applying the doctrine, al-
though rarely referring to it by name.2' The doctrine had be-
come an accepted component of admiralty law, having been
used in admiralty since at least 1804.27 It was readily adopted
by admiralty courts partly because of the equitable nature of
admiralty and partly because of the absence of the usual
venue requirements." In other areas, venue statutes per-
formed the function of case distribution. However, in admi-
ralty, there were no such venue requirements.' Forum non
conveniens thus became a useful and necessary tool for admi-
ralty courts to insure equitable allocation of cases."0
A year before Gulf Oil and Koster were decided, Justice
Cardozo had called the doctrine of forum non conveniens "an
instrument of justice. ' 31 The doctrine, as enunciated in Gulf
Oil and Koster, allows a court to decline jurisdiction, even
where jurisdiction is authorized by a general venue statute,32
when considerations of convenience and oppressiveness make
trial in the chosen forum inappropriate."3
The doctrine has been said to be "simple in enunciation but
complex in application."'3 A forum non conveniens inquiry
does not involve pure questions of law but rather demands the
212-30 (1926). See also Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum 60 HARV. L. REv.
908, 909-10 (1947); Dainow, The Inappropriate Forum, 29 ILL. L. Rev. 867, 881, 885-
86 (1935).
" Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29
COLUM. L. Rev. 1, 1-2 (1929); Braucher, supra note 31, at 911-12. See Gulf Oil v.
Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 505 n.4 ("The doctrine did not originate in federal but in state
courts.").
0 See Bickel, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens as Applied in the Federal
Courts in Matters of Admiralty, 35 CORNELL L. REv. 12 (1949); Braucher, supra note
31, at 920-21. The earliest known admiralty case suggesting a court might decline
jurisdiction was Mason v. The Ship Blaireau, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 143, 157 (1804).
U In 1873, the Supreme Court held that the venue provisions of the Judiciary Act
have no application to admiralty. Atkins v. The Disintegrating Co., 85 U.S. (18 Wall.)
272 (1873).
.Alcoa S.S. Co., Inc. v. M/V Nordic Regent, 654 F.2d 147, 154 (2d Cir.), (en banc),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980), reh'g denied, 450 U.S. 1050 (1981).
" Id.
"' Williams v. Green Bay & W.R. Co., 326 U.S. 549, 554 (1946) (Cardozo, J., dis-
senting) (quoting Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123, 151 (1933)).
" Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947).
a See Koster, 330 U.S. at 524; Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508-9.
Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d 149, 157 (3d Cir. 1980).
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exercise of "structured discretion" by the district judge.35 The
standards set forth in Gulf Oil provide the framework within
which the district judge exercises that discretion." A forum
non conveniens inquiry following the balancing test set forth
in Gulf Oil, is a four-step process.37 First, the district judge
must determine whether an adequate alternative forum ex-
ists.3 8 Second, once the existence of an adequate alternative
forum is verified, the court must consider all the relevant fac-
tors of private interest,3 ' weighing the "relative advantages
and obstacles to a fair trial" in that forum.40 Third, after con-
sidering the relative private interests of the parties, the dis-
trict judge must then examine the public interest factors" af-
fecting the forum itself.42 If it is determined that there is an
so Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See Gulf
Oil, 330 U.S. at 508.
;; The question of whether under Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),
federal or state law should govern a forum non conveniens inquiry in a diversity case
was left open in Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 509. The question remains unanswered. In
Piper, all three parties agreed that federal law should be applied, but they also agree
that it was unnecessary to make the choice because the law of forum non conveniens
in both California and Pennsylvania was identical to federal law in every essential
respect. Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d 149, 157-58 (3d Cir. 1980). Thus, the
Supreme Court in Piper said it did not need to decide the Erie question. Piper Air-
craft Co., v. Reyno, 102 S.Ct. 252, 262 n. 13 (1981).
' Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 784 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
ss Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 506-7 (1947). "In all cases in which the
doctrine of forum non conveniens comes into play, it presupposes at least two forums
in which the defendant is amenable to process; the doctrine furnishes criteria for
choice between them." Id.
39 The Supreme Court in Gulf Oil set forth the following as important private in-
terest factors to consider: (a) relative ease of access to sources of proof; (b) availabil-
ity of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses; (c) cost of obtaining
willing witnesses; (d) possibility of view of the premises, if appropriate; (e) en-
forcibility of a judgment if one is obtained; and (f) all other practical problems affect-
ing the efficiency and fairness of the trial. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508.
40 Id.
4' The Supreme Court in Gulf Oil set forth the following as important factors of
public interest to consider: (a) administrative difficulties associated with court con-
gestion; (b) the imposition of the burden of jury duty on people of a community unre-
lated to the litigation; (c) the local interest in having localized controversies decided
near to home; (d) the avoidance of complex conflict of law problems; and (e) the
appropriateness of having the trial in a forum familiar with the law governing the
case rather than having some other forum untangle foreign law. Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508-9.
" In Koster, the Supreme Court spoke of facts making trial in the chosen forum
inappropriate because of considerations affecting the court's own administrative and
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adequate alternative forum and that the balance of the pri-
vate and public factors favors dismissal, then the district
judge must as his fourth and final step, consider whether the
plaintiff could bring his suit in the alternative forum without
"undue inconvenience or prejudice.""
The doctrine of forum non conveniens seeks to prevent a
plaintiff from vexing, harrassing, or oppressing a defendant by
choosing an inconvenient forum which causes the defendant
undue and unnecessary trouble and expense." However, the
Supreme Court stressed in Gulf Oil that unless the balance of
conveniences strongly favors the defendant, a court should
rarely disturb a plaintiff's choice of forum.4
In Koster, decided the same day as Gulf Oil, the Supreme
Court upheld a forum non conveniens dismissal of a deriva-
tive action brought in a New York federal district court by a
New York plaintiff against an Illinois insurance company.4
Koster was a pragmatic application of the principles set forth
in Gulf Oil.4 7 In Koster, the Supreme Court stated that "the
ultimate inquiry is where the trial will best serve the conve-
nience of the parties and the ends of justice."'48
One year after Gulf Oil and Koster, Congress enacted 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a)49 which codified much of the basic doctrine
legal problems. Koster, 330 U.S. at 524.
40 Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 785 (D.C. Cir. 1980). To ensure
that the plaintiff will not be unduly inconvenienced or prejudiced, the District Court
may place certain conditions on dismissal. For example, the court might require that
the defendants agree to submit to the jurisdiction of the alternative forum and/or
waive any applicable statute of limitations. See, e.g., Schertenleib v. Traum, 589 F.2d
1156, 1166 (2d Cir. 1978); Paper Operations Consultants Int'l, Ltd. v. S.S. Hong Kong
Amber, 513 F.2d 667, 672 (9th Cir. 1975).
Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508.
Id. Defendants bear the burden of establishing that a plaintiff's choice of forum
is inappropriate. See, e.g., Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 784 (D.C.
Cir. 1980).
" 330 U.S. 518, 531-32 (1947).
'7 See Alcoa S.S. Co., Inc. v. M/V Nordic Regent, 654 F.2d 147, 152 (2d Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980), reh'g denied 450 U.S. 1050 (1981).
48 330 U.S. at 527.
4, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976) provides: "For the convenience of parties and wit-
nesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any
other district or division where it might have been brought."
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of forum non conveniens.5 But because § 1404(a) allows
transfer of actions rather than dismissal, it only partly
supercedes the common law doctrine of forum non con-
veniens. The statute was not intended to supplant the federal
courts' power to dismiss a case on forum non conveniens
grounds where the terms of the statute do not apply.5' Thus,
where no alternative federal forum is available and the more
convenient forum is in a state court or foreign country, the
common law doctrine of forum non conveniens is still
applicable.5 2
The doctrine of forum non conveniens remains a necessary
and essential component of the law of federal courts.53 Gulf
Oil and Koster were decided in 1947, shortly after the end of
World War II. After World War II, the world saw a tremen-
dous growth in international commerce and interdepen-
dence.5 4 Multi-national corporations multiplied and interna-
tional transportation of people and products became relatively
commonplace.5 5 As a result, international litigation also in-
creased." As the personal jurisdiction of American courts over
non-residents greatly expanded, defendants increasingly
turned to the doctrine of forum non conveniens as a means of
avoiding litigation of an international dispute in a U.S. federal
so See Sullivan v. Behimer, 363 U.S. 335, 363 n.14 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Historical & Revision Notes to § 1404(a)).
51 Yerostathis v. A. Luisi, Ltd., 380 F.2d 377, 378-79 (9th Cir. 1967).
Id.; Paper Operations Consultants Int'l, Ltd., v. S. S. Hong Kong Amber, 513
F.2d 667, 670 (9th Cir. 1975); Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633,
645-46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956). It is more difficult to satisfy the
standard for obtaining a dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds than it is to
satisfy the standard for obtaining a transfer under § 1404(a). This is because a forum
non conveniens dismissal has a harsher result than a transfer under § 1404(a). Nor-
wood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 31-32 (1955).
" "[TIhe doctrine of forum non conveniens is now well-established in federal prac-
tice." Burt Isthmus Dev. Co., 218 F.2d 353, 356 (5th Cir. 1955).
" See NoteForum Non Conveniens and Foreign Plaintiffs in the Federal Courts,
69 GEo. L. J. 1257, 1258 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note Foreign Plaintiffs]; Note,
The Convenient Forum Abroad Revisited: A Decade of Development of the Doctrine
of Forum Non Conveniens in International Litigation in the Federal Courts, 17 VA.
J. INT'L L. 755, 755-57 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Note, Convenient Forum); Note,
The Convenient Forum Abroad, 20 STAN. L. REv. 57, 57-58 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as Note Forum Abroad].
N Note, Convenient Forum, supra note 54, at 755.
" Id.
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II. CONFLICTS DEVELOP AMONG THE CIRCUITS
The Supreme Court in Gulf Oil had deliberately declined to
set forth specific circumstances which would "justify or re-
quire either grant or denial" of a forum non conveniens dis-
missal.58 Instead, the Supreme Court simply set forth the im-
portant factors to be considered and left the weighing of the
factors to the discretion of the district judge."9 The district
courts began to apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens,
examining and weighing the private and public interest fac-
tors set forth in Gulf Oil. 0 The district courts and the courts
of appeals, however, failed to establish consistent and reliable
guidelines for the exercise of their discretion. This lack of con-
crete standards made the outcome of a forum non conveniens
motion in the federal courts difficult to predict."1
57 Id. at 757; Note, Foreign Plaintiffs, supra note 54, at 1258. For a good general
discussion of federal cases involving the doctrine of forum non conveniens in the
three decades following Gulf Oil, see Note Forum Abroad, supra note 54 (covering
development from 1947 to 1967) and Note Convenient Forum, supra note 54 (cover-
ing developments from 1967 to 1977).
8 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
89 Id. "The doctrine leaves much to the discretion of the court to which plaintiff
resorts, and experience has not shown a judicial tendency to renounce one's own ju-
risdiction so strong as to result in many abuses." Id. The Supreme Court thus en-
trusted the balancing of the factors to the discretion of the district judge. RESTATE-
MN (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 84, comment b (1971). The discretionary
nature of the doctrine was well established in admiralty law prior to Gulf Oil. See,
e.g., The Mandu, 102 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1939); Comment, Admiralty Suits Involving
Foreigners, 31 TEx. L. Rav. 889, 889 n.5 (1953). The question of whether to dismiss
on forum non conveniens grounds was said by one court to be "peculiarly one for the
exercise of judgment by those in daily proximity to these delicate problems of trial
litigation." J.F. Pritchard & Co. v. Dow Chem. of Can., Ltd., 462 F.2d 998, 1000 (8th
Cir. 1972) (Clark, J., sitting by designation)(quoting Lykes Bros. S. S. Inc. v.
Sugarman, 272 F.2d 679 (2d Cir. 1959)).
" Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). The private and public interest
factors set forth in Gulf Oil have generally been followed by all courts presented with
the question of whether jurisdiction should be dismissed to a more convenient foreign
forum. See, e.g., DeMateos v. Texaco, Inc., 562 F.2d 895, 899 (3d Cir. 1977); Fitzger-
ald v. Texaco, Inc., 521 F.2d 448, 450-51 (2d Cir. 1975); J.F. Pritchard & Co. v. Dow
Chem. of Can., Ltd., 462 F.2d 998, 1000 (8th Cir. 1972).
" See A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 41 (1959)(noting that lack of fixed
standards results in the chaos of forum non conveniens); Note, Foreign Plaintiff,
supra note 54, at 1261 ("[L]ower courts have failed to develop reliable standards with
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Where the alternative forum was foreign, the problems as-
sociated with a lack of reliable guidelines were compounded
by the need to consider additional policy factors."' One such
consideration was that a plaintiff forced to litigate in a foreign
forum might face an unfavorable change in the applicable law
which would either totally erase one of the plaintiff's causes of
action, or severely limit the amount of recovery." Another
policy consideration was the citizenship of the plaintiff. Deci-
sions in the Second and Third Circuits were split as to
whether the possibility of an unfavorable change in the law
should preclude dismissal." There was also disagreement
among the circuits as to whether deference should be given to
the citizenship of an American plaintiff, and if so, to what
degree."
III. DISAGREEMENT AS TO WHETHER THE POSSIBILITY OF AN
UNFAVORABLE CHANGE IN THE LAW SHOULD PRECLUDE A
DISMISSAL
A. The Second Circuit
Prior to its decisions in Gulf Oil and Koster, the Supreme
Court had decided a case arising out of a collision between
two vessels in Lake Superior on the American side of the in-
ternational boundary line. In Canada Malting Co. v. Pater-
son," the plaintiffs invoked the jurisdiction of the United
States because American law was more favorable to their posi-
which to balance the conflicting private and public interests."); Schlesinger, Methods
of Progress in Conflicts of Law: Some Comments on Ehrenzweig's Treatment of
"Transient" Jurisdiction, 9 J. PuB. L. 313, 323-24 (1960)("The courts stress some-
times one and sometimes another of these uncoordinated factors. Thus, there has
been a complete failure to develop a reliable standard."); Note, Forum Abroad, supra
note 54, at 58 (Courts have not yet succeeded in developing predictable guidelines.
"While some lack of predictability and certainty is a necessary and acceptable con-
comitant to any discretionary decision, it should not reach such proportions that a
forum non conveniens motion becomes an expensive and time-consuming gamble
that hinders ... justice.").
" Note, Forum Abroad, supra note 54, at 58.
" Note, Foreign Plaintiffs, supra note 54, at 1258.
" See infra, notes 67-109 and accompanying text.
" See infra, notes 110-131 and accompanying text.
285 U.S. 413 (1932).
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tion.67 The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's deci-
sion to dismiss the case despite the possibility that dismissal
would result in an unfavorable change in the applicable law
for the plaintiffs."
Forty-three years after Canada Malting, in Fitzgerald v.
Texaco, Inc.,69 the Second Circuit relied upon Canada Malt-
ing as support for its holding that a district court had discre-
tion to dismiss an action on forum non conveniens grounds
even where the law of the alternative forum was less favorable
to the plaintiff.70 To hold otherwise, reasoned the court, would
"emasculate the doctrine" because a plaintiff would seldom
choose to bring suit in a forum in which his chances of recov-
ery were less favorable. 71 The Second Circuit said the possibil-
ity of an unfavorable change in law was just one of the balanc-
ing factors to consider.7' Justice Oakes dissented, stating that
"[1]imitation upon or denial of recovery is in and of itself
grounds for not dismissing on forum non conveniens
grounds. 7 8
In Alcoa S.S. Co., Inc. v. M/V Nordic Regent,4 the Second
Circuit was again faced with a forum non conveniens ques-
tion. The plaintiff in this action sought recovery for property
damage sustained when defendant's vessel struck plaintiff's
o Id. at 418.
" Id. at 419-20. "We have no occasion to enquire by what law the rights of the
parties are governed, as we are of the opinion that, under any view of that question, it
lay within the discretion of the District Court to decline jurisdiction over the contro-
versy. . . '[Tihe court will not take cognizance of the case if justice would be as well
done by remitting the parties to their home forum.'" Id.
6 521 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1052 (1976). In this case, a
German vessel had struck the wreckage of a Panamanian vessel, owned by Texaco
Panama, Inc., a foreign subsidiary of Texaco, Inc., an American multi-national corpo-
ration, right off the coast of England. Suits were brought against Texaco and its for-
eign subsidiary in New York, Texaco's principal place of business, under general mar-
itime law based on the defendants' alleged failure to properly mark the wreckage.
The defendants filed and were granted a motion to dismiss under the doctrine of
forum non conveniens in the district court. Id. at 449.
70 Id. at 453.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 458 (citing Bickel, supra note 32, at 28-9).
7- 654 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1978)(en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980), reh'g
denied, 450 U.S. 1050 (1981).
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pier in Trinidad. The Second Circuit rejected plaintiff's con-
tention that it would be inequitable to dismiss and relegate
the action to Trinidad where plaintiff's potential recovery
would be severely limited."' Furthermore, the Second Circuit
stated that it was "abundantly clear" that the possibility of a
lesser recovery does not justify a refusal to dismiss on the
grounds of forum non conveniens.7 6
B. The D.C. Circuit
At least one other circuit has concurred with the position of
the Second Circuit that a forum non conveniens dismissal is
not automatically barred where the law of the alternative fo-
rum is less favorable." In Pain v. United Technologies
Corp., the District of Columbia Court of Appeals noted that
in nearly every forum non conveniens inquiry the substantive
law of one forum is more advantageous to one of the litigants
than to the other.79 The court stated that one of the purposes
of conflict-of-laws principles is to aid courts in deciding which
set of laws is most appropriate. The purpose of the forum non
conveniens doctrine, however, is different. Its "central con-
cern is furthering the just, speedy and inexpensive determina-
tion of the action." 80 Therefore, the court concluded that the
comparative amount of recovery which might be obtained
should never be a relevant consideration in a forum non con-
veniens inquiry.81
C. Admiralty Decisions
Several admiralty decisions, including a few decided by the
Second Circuit, took a different approach to the possibility of
11 Id. at 159. The Court noted that it was not unfair for the plaintiff to recover the
lesser amount under Trinidad law because the plaintiff, familiar with the law of the
place where its business was located, could have insured against any additional risk.Id.I; Id.
7 Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 794 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
18 637 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
1" Id. at 794.
80Id.
81 Id.
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an unfavorable change in the law."2 This approach was articu-
lated in 1949 by a commentator when he implied that a limi-
tation upon or denial of recovery should be grounds for not
dismissing for forum non conveniens reasons.83
The jurisdiction of American admiralty courts over suits by
or on behalf of foreign seamen is very broad."' It has been said
that admiralty courts should accept jurisdiction "unless spe-
cial circumstances exist to show that justice would be better
subserved by declining it."s Suits by foreign seamen may be
classified broadly into two categories according to whether the
cause of action is based on American law or not.86 It has been
suggested that when the seaman's cause of action is based on




This approach was exemplified in Fisher v. Agios Nicolaos
V., 88 in which the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals said that a
court must retain jurisdicition rather than dismiss a case on
forum non conveniens grounds once it has been determined
82 See, e.g., Fisher v. Agios Nicolaos V., 628 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1980)(where surviv-
ing widow and dependents of a Greek seaman killed on a foreign vessel in a Texas
port successfully brought a wrongful death action under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. §
688 (1976), and general maritime law; the court of appeals upheld the district court's
refusal to dismiss on the basis of forum non conveniens); Antypas v. Cia Maritima
San Basilio, S.A., 541 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1976)(Seaman injured while employed aboard
a Greek flag ship on a roundtrip voyage from Europe to the Far East brought an
action under the Jones Act. The Second Circuit reversed the District Court's dismis-
sal on forum non conveniens grounds, holding that where the Jones Act applies, a
district court has no power to dismiss on the grounds of forum non conveniens); Bar-
tholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 263 F.2d 437 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
1000 (1959)(A citizen of the British West Indies assaulted by a fellow crew member
while working as a seaman aboard a Liberian vessel brought an action under the
Jones Act and general maritime law).
83 Bickel, supra note 33, at 28-9. See Fitzgerald v. Texaco, Inc., 521 F.2d 448, 458
(2d Cir. 1975) cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1052 (1976)(Oakes, J., dissenting).
8 See Bickel, supra 33, at 20; Morrison, The Foreign Seaman and the Jones Act, 8
MIAMI L. Q. 16, 17 (1953).
:5 The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355, 367 (1885).
86 Comment, A New Look at Lauritzen v. Larsen, Choice of Law and Forum Non
Conveniens, 38 LA. L. REv. 957, 958 (1978).
07 Id. See Antypas v. Cia Maritima San Basilio, S.A., 541 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1976),
in which the Second Circuit stated that once it is determined that American law ap-
plies, "a district court has no power to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens"
in an admiralty case. Id. at 310.
88 628 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1980).
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that American law applies.8 The Court seemed to suggest
that because the determination that American law is applica-
ble is so important, choice-of-law should be the first issue con-
sidered in a forum non conveniens inquiry in an admiralty
case."0 The Fisher court pointed out that the applicability of
foreign law to the case is one of the factors favoring dismissal
on forum non conveniens grounds,"' because it is less conven-
ient for American courts to apply foreign law than it is for the
courts of the foreign country to apply their own law."2 For
similar reasons, the court stated that if American law is appli-
cable, then jurisdiction should be retained rather than
dismissed.93
D. The Third Circuit
In a 1966 admiralty case, Mobil Tankers Company v. Mene
Grande Co.,94 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals refused to
uphold a forum non conveniens dismissal where the plaintiffs
would have been forced to litigate in a Venezuelan forum. 5
The Court retained jurisdiction because it concluded "the
mode of trial, lack of adequate pre-trial procedures and limi-
tation of the manner in which expert testimony may be of-
fered in the alternative forum does not comport with our con-
cepts of fairness.""
In Phoenix Canada Oil Co., Ltd. v. Texaco, Inc.9 7 the court
cited Mobil Tankers in support of its conclusion that dismis-
sal under forum non conveniens requires that the alternative
forum must provide relief for actions of a defendant which al-
legedly violate American law and procedural safeguards simi-
89 Id. at 315.
oid.
Id.(quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947)).
628 F.2d at 315.
93 Id.
- 363 F.2d 611 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 945 (1966).
9 Id. at 614.
"Id.
78 F.R.D. 445 (D. Del. 1978). In this case, a Canadian corporation brought suit
against two international oil and gas companies and their wholly-owned subsidiaries
through which they did business in Ecuador. The suit concerned rights arising from
oil exploration in Ecuador. Id. at 446-47.
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lar to those provided by the American forum.98 The Phoenix
court found it unnecessary to compare procedural safe-
guards,99 and instead considered the fact that there appar-
ently was no generally codified legal remedy in Ecuador for
two of the plaintiff's claims as a factor militating against dis-
missal.10 Notably, the Phoenix court, as well as the courts in
Mobil Tankers and Fisher did not mention Canada Malting,
although it was also an admiralty decision. 101
DeMateos v. Texaco, Inc.'10 crystallized the Third Circuit's
view that the possibility of an unfavorable change in the ap-
plicable law should preclude dismissal. In DeMateos, the
Third Circuit cited Van Dusen v. Barrack'0 s in which the Su-
preme Court had emphasized that a transfer pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a) should not result in a change in the applica-
ble law, regardless of convenience. 10 The DeMateos court
stated that "[t]hat principle is no less applicable to a dismis-
sal on forum non conveniens grounds."' 0 5 Thus, under the
reasoning of DeMateos, the appropriateness of a forum non
conveniens dismissal would depend on one factor-whose law
would apply.
In the 1980 decision in Dahl v. United Technologies
Corp./°" the Third Circuit seemed to contradict its position in
DeMateos by upholding a dismissal where the plaintiffs had
argued that the alternative forum was not acceptable because
it did not afford them remedies comparable to those offered in
the United States.'0 7 However, despite the seeming contradic-
,I ld. at 455.
Id.
100 Id. at 445-46. The court stated: "ETihis case may not simply be one in which a
lesser remedy could be obtained elsewhere than in the United States, but rather one
in which no remedy could be obtained for two of three legal theories advanced." Id.
101 Canada Malting Co. Ltd. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd., 285 U.S. 413 (1932),
discussed supra at notes 67-68 and accompanying text. A possible explanation for
this omission is that Canada Malting was decided prior to Gulf Oil.
562 F.2d 895 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978).
376 U.S. 612 (1964).
,04 Id. at 626-43.
:0 562 F.2d at 899.
100 632 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1980), af'g, 472 F. Supp. 696 (D. Del. 1979).
107 Dahl v. United Technologies Corp., 472 F. Supp. 696, 699 (D. Del. 1979). In
affirming the District Court, the Third Circuit stated that "the mere presence of a
19831
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tion, it could also be argued that the decisions in Dahl and
DeMateos are consistent. The action in Dahl arose out of the
crash of a Norwegian owned and operated helicopter in Nor-
wegian waters in which four Norwegian citizens were killed. 08
The district court considered the plaintiffs' argument that
Norway would not be an acceptable forum because it would
not offer comparable remedies and procedural protections
with those offered in the United States but rejected this argu-
ment, noting that the defendant would be subjected to unlim-
ited liability under Norwegian law for any injuries or damages
caused by its negligence, and that "Norway is in the process
of developing case law built up around product liability
cases." 0 9 Thus, it can be argued that the Dahl court found
there would be no unfavorable change in the applicable law.
IV DEFERENCE TO BE GIVEN PLAINTIFF'S CHOICE OF FORUM
As noted earlier, 110 the Supreme Court in Gulf Oil estab-
lished the standard for a forum non conveniens inquiry, a bal-
ancing of the interests of the plaintiff, the defendant, and the
chosen forum."' The Court then qualified this balancing ap-
proach by stating that "unless the balance is strongly in favor
of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely
be disturbed.""' The Supreme Court thus established a
strong presumption in favor of the plaintiff's choice of fo-
rum."3 But since Gulf Oil was a diversity action brought by a
Virginia plaintiff suing a New York defendant in a New York
district court, there was no need to address what effect citi-
count pleaded under Connecticut law but which may have little chance of success
does not warrant a different conclusion. If we were to hold otherwise, the plaintiffs
could avoid dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds by the inclusion of a sub-
stantive count based on American law regardless of the merits of that claim." 632
F.2d at 1032.
I" Id. at 1028.
,09 Dahl v. United Technologies Corp., 472 F. Supp. 696, 699 (D.C. Del. 1979).
12 See supra notes 37-48(b) and accompanying text.
Note, Forum Non Conveniens and American Plaintiffs in the Federal Courts,
47 U. Cm. L. REv. 373, 376 (1980)[hereinafter cited as Note, American Plaintiffs].
,12 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
1'" Note, American Plaintiffs, supra note 111, at 376; Note, Foreign Plaintiffs,
supra note 54, at 1263.
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zenship or residence should have in a forum non conveniens
inquiry where the plaintiff is foreign or where the plaintiff is
American and the alternative forum is in a foreign country.
The degree of weight which should be given to the citizen-
ship and residence of the plaintiff in a forum non conveniens
inquiry was expressly left open by the Supreme Court in Swift
& Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, S.A.' 1 4
However, the Court did observe that "[a]pplication of forum
non conveniens principles to a suit by a United States citizen
against a foreign respondent brings into force considerations
very different from those in suits between foreigners.''115
Federal courts have been historically reluctant to relegate
an American plaintiff to a foreign forum.11 Therefore, until
recently, the federal courts unanimously placed a much heav-
ier burden of showing inconvenience and public interest on a
defendant seeking a forum non conveniens dismissal where
such a dismissal would force an American plaintiff to litigate
his claim abroad.1 17 This is reflected in the fact that there
were no cases reported before 1970 in which a U.S. plaintiff,
suing in his own right,"' was consigned to a foreign forum
.. 339 U.S. 684, 697 (1949). This was an action brought by the owners of cargo lost
when the vessel transporting the cargo from Ecuador to Cuba sank off the island of
Grand Cayman. The plaintiffs included an American corporation, Cuban corporations
and individuals, and a Columbian citizen. Id. at 685.
I' Id., (quoting Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 330 U.S.
518, 524 (1947) where the Supreme Court stated: "In any balancing of conveniences, a
real showing of convenience by a plaintiff who has sued in his home forum will nor-
mally outweigh the inconvenience the defendant may have shown").
The plaintiff's choice of forum has generally been given less weight when the forum
selected is not the plaintiff's home jurisdiction. See Fitzgerald v. Texaco, Inc., 521
F.2d 448, 451 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1052 (1976).
" Note, Convenient Forum, supra note 54, at 779.
Note, Foreign Plaintiffs, supra note 54 at 1269; Note, American Plaintiffs,
supra note 111, at 379.
8 Where the U.S. plaintiff has only a derivative right to sue, and the real parties
in interest are foreign, the courts have not afforded any special deference to the
plaintiff's choice-of-forum. See, e.g., United States Merchants' & Shippers' Ins. Co. v.
A/S Den Norske Afrika Og Australie Line, 65 F.2d 392, 394 (2d Cir. 1933)(American
plaintiff suing as subtogee of an alien); Fitzgerald v. Westland Marine Corp., 369 F.2d
499, 501-02 (2d Cir. 1966)(American plaintiff suing as alien's representative). But see
Bickel, supra note 33 at 41-43 (noting that even if a constitutional right of access to
federal admiralty courts was given to U.S. citizens, the right would not apply to U.S.
plaintiffs having only a derivative right to sue; reasoning that otherwise, all discretion
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under the forum non conveniens doctrine. 119 Most federal
courts followed a standard similar to that articulated by the
Fifth Circuit in Burt v. Isthmus Development Co., 20 which
required "positive evidence of unusually extreme circum-
stances" as well as "material injustice" before a court would
deny an American citizen access to an American court.''
In the seventies, it became apparent that courts were begin-
ning to divide over the weight that should be attached to a
plaintiff's citizenship in a forum non conveniens inquiry.
Most courts continued to place a greater burden on defen-
dants seeking to relegate an American plaintiff to a foreign
forum; 22 other courts began to give decreasing deference to
the citizenship of American plaintiffs.'"5
to dismiss cases between foreigners would disappear, because every such case would
be assigned to an American, and dismissal would never be appropriate).
"' Note, Convenient Forum, supra note 54, at 779. See Burt Isthmus Dev. Co., 218
F.2d 353, 357 (5th Cir. 1955).
The first unreversed decision granting a forum non conveniens dismissal against an
American plaintiff was Harrison v. Capivary, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
See Note, Convenient Forum, supra note 54 at 785.
:so 218 F.2d 353 (5th Cir.)(per curiam), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 922 (1955).
11 Id. at 354.
,22 See, e.g., Founding Church of Scientology v. Verlag, 536 F.2d 429, 435 (D.C. Cir.
1976)(in dictum, the court observed that only in unusual circumstances should Amer-
ican plaintiffs be denied access to American courts); Paper Operations Consultants,
Int'l Ltd. v. S S Hong Kong Amber, 513 F.2d 667, 672 (9th Cir. 1975) (stating that
one of the "foremost factors" favoring dismissal was the fact that the parties were
foreign nationals); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326,
1344 (2d Cir. 1972)(noting that the fact that the balance of conveniences favors trial
in the foreign forum is not sufficient to warrant dismissing an American citizen's
suit); Olympic Corp. v. Societe Generale, 462 F.2d 376, 378 (2d Cir. 1972)(when a
forum non conveniens dismissal must make a greater showing of inconvenience);
Hoffman v. Goberman, 420 F.2d 423, 428 (3d Cir. 1970)(holding that an American's
choice of forum "should not be disregarded without 'persuasive evidence' of 'manifest
injustice' to the defendant"); Farmanfarmaian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 437 F. Supp. 910,
923 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)(holding that the right of a foreign plaintiff to sue in American
courts is "clearly of lesser magnitude than that of an American citizen"), aff'd 588
F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1978); Maybruck v. Haim, 290 F. Supp. 721, 725 (S.D.N.Y.
1968)(holding that the forum non conveniens doctrine is rarely and reluctantly used
to force an American plaintiff to litigate in a foreign forum).
'" See, e.g., Alcoa S.S. Co., Inc. v. MN Nordic Regent, 654 F.2d 147, 157-58 (2d
Cir.)(en banc)(No special deference should be shown to American plaintiffs), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980), reh'g denied 450 U.S. 1050 (1981); Pain v. United Tech-
nologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 796-99 (D.C. Cir. 1980)("The factor of American citizen-
ship per se proves largely irrelevant" to the forum non conveniens balancing of fac-
tors) cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 980 (1981); Mizokami Bros. of Arizona Inc. v. Baychem
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A leading case exemplifying the trend toward lesser defer-
ence to American plaintiffs was Alcoa S.S. Co. Inc. v. M/V
Nordic Regent,1"4 where the Second Circuit held that no spe-
cial deference should be given to an American plaintiff.125 An
earlier Second Circuit decision, Farmanfarmaian v. Gulf Oil
Corp.,12 6 provided support for the court's opinion in Alcoa. In
Farmanfarmaian, the Second Circuit had dismissed an action
brought by an Iranian citizen in a New York District Court
against the Iranian subsidiary of an oil company based in the
United States.12 7 The Alcoa court cited Farmanfarmaian for
the proposition that "American citizenship is not an impene-
trable shield against dismissal on the ground of forum non
conveniens'' 8. The Second Circuit reaffirmed its Alcoa hold-
ing in Calavo Growers of California v. Gernerali Belgium, 29
where it upheld a forum non conveniens dismissal of an ac-
tion brought by a U.S. plaintiff against a Belgian underwriter
for failure to pay a claim for reimbursement when figs which
the plaintiff had contracted to import from Turkey failed to
pass government inspection upon entry to a New York port.130
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals also
cited Alcoa with approval in Pain v. United Technologies
Corp.,'31 although it conflicted in principle with the court's
earlier approach in Founding Church of Scientology v.
Corp., 556 F.2d 975, 978 (9th Cir. 1977)(per curiam)(noting that American citizenship
of plaintiff standing alone, not sufficient ground for opposition to a motion to dismiss
for forum non conveniens), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978); Texaco Trinidad, Inc.
v. Astro Exito Navegacion S.A., Panama, 437 F. Supp. 331, 333-34 (S.D.N.Y.
1977)(stating that plaintiff-corporation's U.S. citizenship was a "factor" but not "con-
trolling if the balance of factors tips heavily in favor of defendants").
124 654 F.2d 147 (2d Cir.)(en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980), reh'g denied,
450 U.S. 1050 (1981).
125 Id. at 159. The court noted: "The trend of both common law generally and ad-
miralty law in particular has been away from according a talismanic significance to
the citizenship of the parties." Id. at 154.
:26 588 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1978).
27 Id. at 880.
118 654 F.2d at 152 (emphasis in the original).
129 632 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1084 (1981) reh'g denied, 451
U.S. 934 (1981)).
180 Id. at 965-66.
131 637 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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Verlag. s2 The Pain court said federal courts were starting to
realize that their traditional reluctance to dismiss actions to
foreign tribunals was merely due to over-protectiveness of
American plaintiffs and insensitivity to the ability and compe-
tence of foreign courts."'8
The Ninth Circuit in Mizokami Bros. of Arizona, Inc."s4 ar-
ticulated one reason why some courts had begun to give less
deference to the American citizenship of a plaintiff:
In an era of increasing international commerce, parties who
choose to engage in international transactions should know
that when their foreign operations lead to litigation they can-
not expect always to bring their foreign opponents into a U.S.
forum when every reasonable consideration leads to the conclu-
sion that the site of the litigation should be elsewhere. '88
Despite the fact that these decisions departed from the tradi-
tional deference given to American plaintiffs, creating further
uncertainty for courts applying the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, the Supreme Court declined to grant the petitions
for certiorari submitted in Alcoa, Calavo, Pain, and
Mizokami Bros.. Amid the confusion, most courts, even those
giving deference to American citizenship, did seem to agree on
one thing: an American plaintiff does not have an "absolute
right" to sue in a United States court.'3
V. PIPER AIRCRAFT v. REYNO
When Piper reached the Third Circuit Court of Appeals the
district judge's decision to dismiss on forum non conveniens
'" 536 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
Pain, 637 F.2d at 797.
184 556 F.2d 975 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978).
"' Id. at 978.
' See, e.g., Mizokami Bros. of Arizona, Inc. v. Baychem Corp., 556 F.2d 975, 977
(9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978); Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton
Co., 234 F.2d 633, 646 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956); John Fabrick Trac-
tor Co. v. Penelop Shipping Co., 278 F. Supp. 182, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). But see
United States Merchants' & Shippers' Ins. Co. v. A/S Den Norske Afrika Og Aus-
tralie Line, 65 F.2d 392, 394 (2d Cir. 1933)(Hand, J.)(holding that American citizen-
ship should be conclusive against dismissal).
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grounds was reversed and remanded. 13 7 The Third Circuit
based its decision in part on its conclusion that dismissal on
the ground of forum non conveniens is automatically pre-
cluded where the substantive law that would be applied in the
alternative forum is less favorable to the plaintiff than the law
of the chosen forum.' The district court had found that
Scottish law, which does not recognize strict liability in tort,
governed the case.' 89
Applying its own choice-of-law analysis, the Third Circuit
concluded that the district court had erred and that Pennsyl-
vania law should govern. 40 The Third Circuit observed that if
107 Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d 149, 171 (3d Cir. 1980).
IU Id. at 164-65.
[I]t is apparent that the dismissal would work a change in the applica-
ble law so that the plaintiff's strict liability claim would be eliminated
from the case. But . . . a dismissal for forum non conveniens, like a
statutory transfer, 'should not, despite its convenience, result in a
change in the applicable law.' Only when American law is not applica-
ble, or when the foreign jurisdiction would, as a matter of its own
choice of law, give the plaintiff the benefit of the claim to which she is
entitled here, would dismissal be justified.
Id.(footnote omitted)(quoting DeMateos v. Texaco, Inc., 562 F.2d 895, 899 (3d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978)).
The Third Circuit also held that the district court had abused its discretion in its
application of the Gulf Oil factors. 630 F.2d at 160. However, the Third Circuit said
that it would have reversed the district court's decision even if the lower court had
properly balanced the Gulf Oil public and private interest factors. 630 F.2d at 163-64.
"I9 Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 479 F. Supp. 727, 736-37 (M.D. Pa. 1979).
11" 630 F.2d at 171. The Third Circuit agreed with the district court that California
choice-of-law rules applied to Piper and that Pennsylvania choice-of-law rules would
apply to Hartzell under the rules enunicated in Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313
U.S. 487 (1941) (holding that a court must generally apply the choice-of-law rules of
the state in which it sits) and Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1946) (holding
that where a case is transferred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), it must apply the
choice-of-law rules of the transferor-state). But the Third Circuit disagreed with the
district court's conclusion that California uses a "governmental interests" analysis.
630 F.2d at 165-71. The Third Circuit said that California would use a "comparative
impairment" approach, which the court defined as a "refinement of the governmental
interest and false conflict methodology." 630 F.2d 166. This approach, however, said
the court, comes into play only after a "true conflict of the governmental interests
involved" is identified. 630 F.2d 166. The Third Circuit found that Pennsylvania's
approach would be similar to that off California. It said "Pennsylvania first looks to
identify and thus avoid false conflicts, and then when a true conflict is present, exam-
ines and compares competing governmental interests." 630 F.2d 169. Thus finding
that both California and Pennsylvania would first employ the "false conflict" test, the
Third Circuit concluded that Pennsylvania and Ohio had a greater policy interest in
the dispute than Scotland, and therefore American law would be applied. 630 F.2d at
1983]
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the case were tried in Scotland, the lex loci delecti choice-of-
law rule for torts would have applied,4 1 causing Reyno to lose
the strict liability cause of action which was recognized in
Pennsylvania. 42
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court did not find
the possibility of an unfavorable change in law decisive. It
held that the Third Circuit had erred in holding that plain-
tiffs may defeat a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum
non conveniens merely by showing that the law of the alterna-
tive forum would be less favorable. 43 The Court stated "[tjhe
possibility of a change in substantive law should ordinarily
not be given conclusive or even substantial weight in the fo-
rum non conveniens inquiry.'"
4
The Supreme Court re-affirmed the balancing test set forth
in Gulf Oil as the appropriate test in a forum non conveniens
inquiry.' 4 ' The Court noted that Gulf Oil established conve-
nience as the central focus of a forum non conveniens in-
quiry." Giving substantial weight to the possibility of an un-
favorable change in the law averts that focus, reasoned the
Court, because dismissal might then be barred even where
trial in the chosen forum was plainly inconvenient.'
4 7
The Court stressed the value of flexibility in the doctrine of
forum non conveniens, a quality which earlier Supreme Court
decisions had also emphasized."' 8 If substantial weight were to
be given to a possibility of an unfavorable change in the law,
168, 170.
... 630 F.2d at 163. Lex loci delicti is the traditional conflict-of-laws rule applicable
to torts. 16 Am. Jur. 2d Conflict of Laws §98 (1979). It states that the law of the place
where the acts giving rise to the action occurred is the law which should be applied.
Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 583 (1953).
"' Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966).
:48 102 S. Ct. at 261.
44 Id.
:,5 See supra notes 39-48 and accompanying text.
,1 102 S. Ct. at 262.
147 Id.
148 In Gulf Oil, the Court refused to specify specific circumstances "which will jus-
tify or require either grant or denial of remedy." 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947). In Wil-
liams v. Green Bay & Western R.R. Co., 326 U.S. 549 (1946), the Court refused to lay
down a rigid rule to govern discretion, stating that "each case turns on its facts." Id.
at 557.
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the Court said that the forum non conveniens doctrine would
not only lose its valuable flexibility but would become virtu-
ally useless because plaintiffs will ordinarily choose the forum
with the most advantageous choice-of-law rules. 4 9
The Court noted that giving substantial weight to the possi-
bility of a change in the law would create considerable practi-
cal problems. One result of such an approach, said the Court,
would be that choice-of-law analysis would be elevated in im-
portance.'50 Because dismissal would only be appropriate
where the court found that the law of the alternative forum to
be at least as favorable to the plaintiff as the law in the cho-
sen forum, courts would be forced to conduct complex exer-
cises in comparative law,' 51 an inefficient activity which the
forum non conveniens doctrine was in part designed to pre-
vent. 52 Another practical problem which the Supreme Court
feared was a substantial increase in the flow of litigation into
already congested United States courts. 53
Unlike the Third Circuit, which had partly based its deci-
sion on an analogy between forum non conveniens dismissals
and § 1404(a) transfers, the Supreme Court said such dismis-
sals and transfers were not comparable. 54 Thus, the ruling in
Van Dusen v. Barrack,'5" which was relied upon by the Third
Circuit 5 6 and which stated that a § 1404(a) transfer should
not result in a change in the applicable law, would not extend
to a dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds. 5 7
"1 102 S. Ct. at 262-63.
150 Id. at 263. Compare this approach with the Fifth Circuit's emphasis on the
choice-of-law issue in Fisher v. Agios Nicolaos V, 628 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1980), dis-
cussed supra, at notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
11 102 S. Ct. at 263.
102 Id. In Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 509, one of the public interest factors which the
Court sets forth as indicating dismissal was desirable was the necessity for the court
to "untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself."
102 S. Ct. at 264.
" Id. District courts have more discretion to dismiss under §1404(a) than under
the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29 (1955).
155 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
I" Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d 149, 164 n.51 (quoting DeMateos v. Tex-
aco, Inc., 562 F.2d 895, 899 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978).
,57 102 S. Ct. at 265. The Second Circuit stated that rules governing §1404(a)
transfers will not also govern forum non conveniens dismissals. Schertenleib v.
Traum, 589 F.2d 1156 (2d Cir. 1978).
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The Supreme Court did not, however, hold that the possi-
bility of an unfavorable change in the law would never be a
significant factor in a forum non conveniens inquiry.158 The
Court said in "rare circumstances," where the "remedy pro-
vided by the alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or un-
satisfactory that it is no remedy at all," the initial require-
ment of an adequate alternative forum may not be satisfied. 59
In these rare cases, a district court may conclude dismissal
would "not be in the interests of justice." 10
The Court provided no guidelines to assist a district court
in determining whether the remedy in the alternative forum is
essentially "no remedy at all,"'' but the Court made it clear
that in Piper the remedies available in the Scottish courts did
not fall within this category.1 62 The Court observed that while
the strict liability claim would not be available in the Scottish
courts and the potential damage award would be smaller than
in America, there was no indication that the decedent's heirs
and next of kin would not have any remedy or that they
would be treated unfairly.' 3
In Part III of its opinion, the Supreme Court also found
that the district court's analysis of the public and private in-
terest factors was not an abuse of discretion.' 4 Because the
1" 102 S. Ct. at 265.
15 Id.
' Id.
'' Id. The Court did, however, cite an example, Phoenix Can. Oil Co. v. Texaco,
Inc., 78 F.R.D. 445 (D.C. Del. 1978), in which the court refused to dismiss where the
alternative forum was in Ecuador. It was unclear whether an Ecuadorian court would
hear the case, and there was no generally codified legal remedy in Ecuador for the
claims asserted. 102 S. Ct. at 265 n.22. In a case decided after Piper, a United States
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio stated that the citation of Phoenix
did not imply that the only situation in which a court might find there was no alter-
native forum was one in which the remedy was clearly inadequate. Lake v. Richard-
son-Merrell, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 262, 270 n.12 (N.D. Ohio 1982).
16 102 S. Ct. at 265.
163 Id.
"1 102 S. Ct. at 265-68. Justice White concurred in Parts I and II of the opinion,
but said that he would not proceed to deal with the issues discussed in Part III.
Instead, he agreed with the dissent as to that issue. 102 S. Ct. at 268-69. Justice
Stevens, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented, stating that the court had limited its
grant of certiorari to whether the plaintiffs could defeat a motion to dismiss on the
ground of forum non conveniens, merely by showing that the law of the alternative
forum was less favorable. Although he agreed that the question should be answered in
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forum non conveniens inquiry is committed to the sound dis-
cretion of the district judge, it may be reversed only where the
district judge has clearly abused that discretion.05 The Su-
preme Court stated that the Third Circuit had ignored this
standard of review and instead substituted its own judgment
for that of the district judge.'66
Also, the Court indicated its agreement with the district
judge that the presumption in favor of the plaintiff's choice of
forum applies with less force when the plaintiff or real parties
in interest are foreign.167 Thus, the Supreme Court settled a
question which had previously divided the circuits. " The
Court noted that in Koster it had stated that a plaintiff's
choice of forum is entitled to greater deference when the
plaintiff has chosen the home forum." Observing that conve-
nience can be generally assumed when an American plaintiff
has chosen an American forum, the Court stated that when a
foreign plaintiff has chosen an American forum this assump-
tion of convenience is much less reasonable.17 0 Because the
central focus of a forum non conveniens inquiry is conve-
nience, the Supreme Court reasoned that a foreign plaintiff's
choice of forum deserves less deference.' 7 ' However, the Court
made it clear that although the choice of an American forum
by an American citizen or resident should be given more def-
erence that the foreign plaintiff's choice of an American fo-
rum, it should not automatically bar dismissal. 172 The Court
the negative, he said he would remand the case to the Court of Appeals for further
consideration. 102 S. Ct. at 269.
102 S. Ct. at 266.
, Id.
117 Id. at 265.
'I8 See supra notes 110-31 and accompanying text.
16 330 U.S. at 524. "In any balancing of conveniences, a real showing of conve-
nience by a plaintiff who has sued in his home forum will normally outweigh the
inconvenience the defendant may have shown." Id.
170 102 S. Ct. at 266.
171 Id.
I's 102 S. Ct. at 266 n.23. See Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775,
796-98 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("American citizens and residents have no indefeasible right
of access to the federal courts"); Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 645
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956) ("An American citizen does not have an
absolute right under all circumstances to sue in an American court").
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concluded that if the balancing of private and public interest
factors indicates that trial in the chosen forum is then inap-
propriate, even if the plaintiff is an American citizen or resi-
dent, dismissal is proper. 17 8
The plaintiffs in Piper argued that by "bestowing upon the
injured plaintiff the right to seek redress wherever he sees fit
...the defendant accused of wrongdoing will always be held
to the highest available standard of accountability for his ac-
tions and resulting injuries and damages.' 7 ' The Court noted
plaintiff's contention 75 but said that the deference tradition-
ally accorded a plaintiff's choice of forum had never been a
guarantee that the plaintiff could choose the law that would
govern the case.76 The Supreme Court recognized the possi-
bility that defendants might engage in "reverse forum-shop-
ping"-seeking a forum non conveniens dismissal not merely
because of inconvenience but also because of a desire for a
more favorable forum. 7 7 To discourage this, the Court em-
phasized that the possiblity of a favorable change in the law
to the defendant should not be given substantial weight.7"
This, the Court said, was a necessary corollary to its holding
that substantial weight should not be given to the possibility
of an unfavorable change in the law to the plaintiff. 7 9
VI. CONCLUSION
Piper is the first Supreme Court decision to squarely ad-
dress the issue of forum non conveniens since the seminal de-
cisions of Gulf Oil and Koster in 1947. Although the decision
leaves some questions unanswered, such as what standards
should be applied to cases involving U.S. resident plaintiffs' 80
and how a district court can determine whether it is faced
73 102 S. Ct. at 266 n.23.
"' Brief for Respondent (Reyno) at 7, Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 102 S. Ct. 252
(1981).
... 102 S. Ct. at 266 n.24.
176 Id.
77 Id. at 264 n.19.
178 Id.
17 Id.
,8o See supra notes 159-162 and accompanying text.
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with one of those "rare circumstances" where the remedy in
the alternative forum is so inadequate as to not be a remedy
at all,"'1 the decision should help to clarify the doctrine of fo-
rum non conveniens and ease some of the confusion in its ap-
plication in the lower courts.
Piper is a significant decision, particularly for the aviation
industry. The United States has a strong interest in foreign
aviation accidents. American manufacturers, such as Piper
Aircraft Corp. and Hartzell Propeller, Inc. predominate in the
manufacture of aircraft used in all parts of the world."8 2
American air carriers and aviation corporations are present
and operate in nearly every country in the world.8 3
The decision in Piper should prove to be a boon to defen-
dants facing international litigation in federal courts, while a
bane to many plaintiffs. The decision can be expected to make
it much more difficult for a foreign plaintiff to sue in a U.S.
federal court for accidents and injuries occurring abroad, since
implicit in the Piper decision is a refusal to establish the fed-
eral courts as "super-court(s) of international jurisdiction."'8 4
This rejects the view that only American law can adequately
protect rights and provide justice, and finds support in an ear-
lier Supreme Court decision which observed that "[wie cannot
have trade and commerce in world markets and international
" While the Supreme Court held that the choice of an American forum by an
American citizen in his own behalf should be given more deference than a foreign
citizen's choice of an American forum, it did little to clarify how much a court should
defer to American citizenship. Thus, it can be expected that the controversy among
the circuits on this issue will continue. See supra notes 124-136. In view of the con-
flict among recent cases dealing with the issue it is surprising that the Supreme Court
did not attempt to delineate a rule broad enough to also provide guidance in cases
involving American plaintiffs. See Paulsen, Forum Non Conveniens in Admiralty, 13
JOUR. MAR. L & COM. 343, 360 (1982).
182 Miller, Aviation Accident Investigation: Functional and Legal Perspectives, 46
J. AIR L. & CoM. 237, 283 (1981) "Ninety to ninety-five percent of the free world's air
carrier aircraft bear the labels of American companies as do about eighty percent of
the free World's general aviation aircraft." Id.
188 Id.
18 See Xerakis v. Greek Line, Inc. 382 F. Supp. 774, 777 (E.D. Pa. 1974) in which
the court noted: "[W]e live in an international community and by definition from the
view of certain interests the laws of some other countries may be more or less
favorable to the special interest. But we are not a super-court of international juris-
diction . .. ."
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waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and
resolved in our courts."""s
There are several facets of American law which appeal to
foreign plaintiffs. As an English judge put it recently: "As a
moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the United
States.""' Some of the reasons for this attraction include the
American legal system's recognition of contingency fees, the
right to a jury trial, higher damage awards, and the fact that
the losing party is rarely forced to pay the prevailing party's
attorney's fees. 8
7
American products liability law is particularly attractive to
foreign plaintiffs. Strict liability originated in the United
States, where it is a part of the law of all but a few states 88
but it has been adopted by few countries. 8 9 As in Scotland,
many countries prefer to encourage industry by being more
protective of manufacturers, and thus have continued to rely
on the negligence standard under which it is relatively more
difficult for a consumer to recover. 90 If the Third Circuit's de-
cision had been allowed to stand, a citizen of any country not
recognizing strict liability could have sued in almost any U.S.
district court without fear of a forum non conveniens dismis-
sal, whether or not litigation in that forum would have been
inconvenient and oppressive.
It could be argued that an American manufacturer choosing
to sell products in other countries should still be held to the
standard of care of the country in which its products are pro-
duced. Then in the event one of the products causes injury,
185 M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972).
16 Smith Kline & French Laboratories Ltd. and Another v. Bloch, Court of Appeal
(Civil Division), The Times, May 17, 1982.
1s7 Id. See also Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 102 S. Ct. at 264 n.18.
1s8 All but six states (Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, Virginia
and Wyoming) recognize strict liability in tort. 1 PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) § 4016
(1982).
"I France, Belgium and Luxembourg have laws similar to American strict liability,
and West Germany and Japan have strict liability statutes pertaining to
pharmaceuticals. 102 S. Ct. at 264 n.18. See generally Orban, Product Liability: A
Comparative Legal Restatement-Foreign National Law and the E.E.C. Directive, 8
GA. J. INT. & COMP. L. 342 (1978); Hollenshead & Conway, An Overview: Interna-
tional Products Liability, 16 Trial 50 (Nov., 1980).
190 Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d at 167-8.
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the manufacturer's liability should not depend on the fortuity
of the injury occurring to a user who happens to reside in a
country recognizing a lesser standard of care. The purposes of
strict liability in tort include deterrence as well as equitable
allocation of risk.
19 1
But the Piper decision is not favorable to this line of rea-
soning. The decision can be expected to discourage foreign
plaintiffs from seeking redress from American manufacturers
in U.S. courts. The decision adds impetus to the current swing
in the products liability pendulum back towards more protec-
tiveness of the defendant, a subtle movement best evidenced
by the growing number of states which have adopted compar-
ative fault. 92
In summary, by its decision in Piper, the Supreme Court
has indicated a desire to avoid burdening crowded federal
courts with suits having little connection with the United
States. The decision encourages district courts to exercise re-
straint in retaining jurisdiction over suits which more appro-
priately should be tried elsewhere. In so doing, the Supreme
Court has rejected the parochial notion that the "'liberal pur-
poses' of American law must be exported to wherever (Ameri-
can) multi-national corporations are permitted to do
business."'
Sheryl Anne Self
AIRLINE DEREGULATION-EsSENTIAL AIR TRANSPOR-
TATION FOR SMALL COMMUNITIES-Under the Small Commu-
nity Air Service Program, the Civil Aeronautics Board May
Postpone Service Suspensions Only at Points Served by One
Certified Air Carrier, and Cannot Require Airlines to Give
"' See Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and Accidents, YALE L.J. 656 (1975); Cala-
bresi & Hirshoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L. J. 1055,
1075-84 (1972).
,91 See, e.g., Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 380 (1978).
'93 Demateos v. Texaco, Inc., 562 F.2d 895, 902 (2d Cir. 1977).
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Notice of Any Service Suspension to a Community Served by
More Than One Certified Air Carrier. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v.
Civil Aeronautics Board, 674 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
Eastern Air Lines (Eastern) filed notice with the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB) and the City of Montgomery,
Alabama on February 22, 1980, of its intent to indefinitely
suspend all service to Montgomery beginning on or after June
1, 1980.' In the notice filed pursuant to the Airline
Deregulation Act of 19782 (Deregulation Act), Eastern stated
that the proposed service termination would not deprive
Montgomery of essential air transportation.' The City of
Montgomery, the City of Montgomery Airport Authority, and
the Montgomery Area Chamber of Commerce filed a petition
with the CAB asking that Eastern be required to continue air
service until Montgomery's peak travel season was over on
September 15, 1980.'
The CAB ruled that Eastern had to offer one daily round-
trip flight between Montgomery and Atlanta until June,
1980.1 The CAB also ordered Delta Air Lines (Delta) and
Republic Air Lines (Republic), the other two airlines serving
Montgomery, to give ninety days notice of any reduction of
service at Montgomery,6 and to submit weekly reports of
passenger traffic at that city.7 Delta did not initially comply
with the reporting requirements of the order.' Based on
Eastern's and Republic's first reports, the CAB found that
"there will continue to be insufficient capacity at Montgomery
without at least one daily round trip by Eastern" to Atlanta,?.
and ruled to extend the order's requirements until July 30,
Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 674 F.2d 1, 2-3 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
§ 401(j), Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 current version at 49 U.S.C. § 1371(j)
(Supp. III 1979).
o Brief for Respondent at 11-12, Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board,
674 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Brief For Respondent].
Id. at 12.
* In re Eastern Air Lines, Inc., CAB Order 80-5-170, 6 (May 23, 1980).
I ld. at 7.
7Id.
6 Brief for Respondent, supra note 3, at 15.
' In re Eastern Air Lines, Inc., CAB Order 80-6-174, 1 (June 24, 1980).
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1980.10 Delta began compliance with the CAB's reporting
requirement on June 30, 1980." Upon review of the passenger
traffic reports, the CAB terminated Eastern's requirement of
continuing service'" and also terminated the requirements
that Delta and Republic report traffic and reductions in
service."3
Delta and Republic then filed petitions for reconsideration
which asserted that the CAB had had no legal authority to
require Eastern to maintain service or to regulate and monitor
their own service. 14 The CAB reconsidered its actions even
though it held the petitions to be moot following termination
of Eastern's requirement to maintain one daily round trip to
Atlanta and Delta and Republic's notice and reporting
requirements' 5 in In re Eastern Air Lines, Inc..'6 The CAB
also relied on the language of sections 419(a)(10)' 7 and
407(a)'8 of the Deregulation Act to uphold its earlier action of
10 Id.
'I Brief for Respondent, supra note 3, at 15.
" In re Eastern Air Lines, Inc., CAB Order 80-7-75, 2 (July 11, 1980).
I3 d. at 3.
" Brief for Respondent, supra note 3, at 15.
' In re Eastern Air Lines, Inc., CAB Order 80-8-180, 1 (Aug. 29, 1980).
10 CAB Order 80-7-75 (July 11, 1980).
" Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 § 419(a)(10), 49 U.S.C. § 1389(a)(10) (Supp. III
1979) provides:
Unless the Board has determined what is essential air transportation
for any eligible point pursuant to paragraph (2) of this subsection, the
Board shall, upon petition of any appropriate representative of such
point, prohibit any termination, suspension, or reduction of air
transportation which reasonably appears to deprive such point of
essential air transportation, until the Board has completed such
determination.
Id.
Is International Air Transporation Competition Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-192, §
10, 94 Stat. 38 (1980) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 1377(a) (Supp.IV 1980)) states:
The Board is empowered to require annual, monthly, periodical, and
special reports from any air carrier; to prescribe the manner and form
in which such reports shall be made; and to require from any air
carrier specific answers to all questions upon which the Board may
deem information to be necessary. Such reports shall be under oath
whenever the Board so requires. The Board may also require any air
carrier to file with it a true copy of each or any contract, agreement,
understanding, or arrangement, between such air carrier or foreign air
carrier . . . and any other carrier or person, in relation to any traffic
affected by the provisions of this chapter.
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suspending Eastern's termination of service 9 and to uphold
the passenger reporting requirement of its earlier orders."0
On appeal, Delta argued that the CAB improperly invoked
section 419(a) (10)1 by suspending Eastern's termination of
service while Delta and Republic continued to serve
Montgomery.2 2 In addition, Delta argued that because there
had been no determination of essential air transportation for
Montgomery, 8 nor was there one pending, the CAB did not
have the power to require Delta and Republic to give ninety
days notice of any reduction in service2' under section 419(a)
(3) (A).2 5 Held, reversed on all points except the reporting
requirement: Under the Small Community Air Service
Program, the Civil Aeronautics Board may postpone service
suspensions only at points served by one certified air carrier
Id.
.. In re Eastern Air Lines, Inc., CAB Order 80-8-180, 7 (Aug. 19, 1980).
1o In re Eastern Air Lines, Inc., CAB Order 80-8-180, 8 (Aug. 29, 1980). The CAB
stated:
We must closely monitor the remaining traffic and service at the point
so that we may allow the incumbent carrier to suspend service as soon
as possible. For this reason, we often require all carriers serving the
point to submit weekly traffic data for their operations at that point.
Our authority to require these filings is found in section 407(a), which
empowers us to require periodic and special reports from any carrier.
Id.
" Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 § 419(a)(10), 49 U.S.C. § 1389(a)(10) (Supp. Ill
1979). See supra note 16.
" Reply Brief for Petitioner at 25, Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board,
674 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Reply Brief for Petitioner).
"' Id. at 26.
04 Id.
"' Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 § 419(a)(3)(A), 49 U.S.C. § 1389(a)(3)(A)
provides:
(3) No air carrier shall terminate, suspend, or reduce air
transportation to any eligible point below the level of essential air
transportation established by the Board under paragraph (2) unless
such air carrier-
(A) if such air carrier-(i)holds a certificate issued under section
1371 of this title, or (ii)does not hold such a certificate, but is
receiving compensation pursuant to paragraph (5) of this
subsection for service to such eligible point,
has given the Board, the appropriate State agency or agencies, and the
communities affected at least ninety days notice prior to such
termination, suspension, or reduction.
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and cannot require airlines to give ninety days notice of any
service suspension to a community served by more than one
certified air carrier. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics
Board, 674 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
I. HISTORY
A. Federal Aviation Act of 1958
Under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (Act),2 6 the philoso-
phy of government regulation was one of controlled entry into
and departure from the air service industry.2 7 Section 401(a)
of the Act2 prohibited all air carriers from engaging in air
transportation unless they had received a CAB-issued certifi-
cate authorizing air transportation.2 Each certificate specified
the routes the air carrier was authorized to fly,3O and could
only be issued if the CAB found that public convenience and
necessity required the air carrier's service.31In addition the Federal Aviation Act of 19582 strictly regu-
26 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958) (current
version at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1976)).
27 Frontier Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 621 F.2d 369, 371 (10th Cir. 1980).
S 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1976).
49 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (1976) provides that, "No air carrier shall engage in any
transportation unless there is in force a certificate issued by the Board authorizing
such air carrier to engage in such transportation."
SO 49 U.S.C. § 1371(e)(1) (1976), provides:
Each certificate issued under this section shall specify the terminal
points and intermediate points, if any, between which the air carrier is
authorized to engage in air transportation and the service to be ren-
dered; and there shall be attached to the exercise of the privileges
granted by the certificate, or amendment thereto, such reasonable
terms, conditions, and limitations as the public interest may require.
Id.
81 49 U.S.C. § 1371(d)(1)(1976) states:
The Board shall issue a certificate authorizing the whole or any part of
the transportation covered by the application, if it finds that the appli-
cant is fit, willing, and able to perform such transportaion properly,
and to conform to the provisions of this Act and the rules, regulations,
and requirements of the Board hereunder, and that such transporta-
tion is required by the public convenience and necessity; otherwise
such application shall be denied.
Id.
-2 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1976).
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lated an air carrier's withdrawal from a route.3" The carrier
could petition the CAB to amend its certificate to allow re-
moval of a point from a route3 4 or to authorize the complete
abandonment of a route." However, the only way a carrier
could terminate service to a market was with the CAB's per-
mission." Both methods required the CAB to authorize the
withdrawal only after notice and hearings and a finding that
the withdrawal was in the public interest.3 7
The Act did not, however, regulate an air carrier's service
beyond entry into and total withdrawal from a market.38
While the CAB could take an air carrier's schedule, equip-
ment, accommodations and facilities into account when ap-
proving a certificate for an air carrier,3 9 it could not directly
regulate such factors.' 0 An air carrier could choose to route a
passenger in any fashion as long as the passenger eventually
33 49 U.S.C. §§ 1371(g), 1371(j) (1976).
34 49 U.S.C. § 1371(g) (1976) provides in part: "The Board upon petition or com-
plaint or upon its own initiative, after notice and hearings, may alter, amend, modify,
or suspend any such certificate, in whole or in part, if the public convenience and
necessity so require."
35 49 U.S.C. § 1371(j) (1976), provides in part: "No air carrier shall abandon any
route, or part thereof, for which a certificate has been issued by the Board, unless,
upon the application of such air carrier, after notice and hearing, the Board shall find
such abandonment to be in the public interest."
36 49 U.S.C. §§ 1371(g), 1371(j) (1976), discussed supra at notes 32-33 and accom-
panying test.
37 Id.
38 49 U.S.C. § 1371(e)(4) (1976), which provides:
No term, condition, or limitation of a certificate shall restrict the right
of an air carrier to add to or change schedules, equipment, accommo-
dations, and facilities for performing the authorized transportation
and service as the development of the business and the demands of the
public shall require; except that the Board may impose such terms,
conditions, or limitations in a certificate for supplemental air transpor-
tation when required by subsection (d)(3) of this section.
Id.
39 49 U.S.C. § 1371(e)(1) (1976), states:
Each certificate issued under this section shall specify the terminal
points and intermediate points, if any, between which the air carrier is
authorized to engage in air transportation and the service to be ren-
dered; and there shall be attached to the exercise of the privileges
granted by the certificate, or amendment thereto, such reasonable
terms, conditions, and limitations as the public interest may require.
Id.
40 49 U.S.C. § 1371(e)(4) (1976), discussed supra at note 38.
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reached the authorized destination.4 ' Thus' entry into and
exit from a market were closely regulated by the CAB under
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, but the type and extent of
service to a market by an air carrier was not."'
B. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978
The Deregulation Act, meant to be a legislative mandate to
the CAB as to both the direction and limitations of its future
powers, 43 represents a major change in the government's phi-
losophy. The Deregulation Act was designed to create a
gradual transition to deregulation of the industry in order to
make it subject to competitive market forces. 45 To facilitate
deregulation between 1978 and December 31, 1981, the Dereg-
ulation Act eased several requirements so that an air carrier's
entry into a market need only be "consistent" with public
convenience and necessity6 rather than "required" by public
"' Phoenix-Des Moines/Milwauke Route Proceeding, CAB Order 78-1-116, 27 (Jan.
27, 1978). The CAB did not require that an air carrier provide nonstop flights for all
markets for which it had nonstop authority. An air carrier could fulfill its certificate
service requirements by routing a passenger in any manner as long as the passenger
reaches the authorized destination.
See supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text.
H. R. Rep. No. 1779, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 56 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Confer-
ence Report] (cited in Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 674 F.2d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
The Conference Report reads in part:
In adopting this new, comprehensive legislation which entirely over-
hauls the aviation regulatory system, Congress was mindful of recent
activities of the CAB. This new charter is intended as a legislative
mandate to the CAB both as to the direction and policy of aviation
regulation and also, it should be noted, the limits of such policy. In
short, Congress expects the deregulation of the aviation industry to
move in accordance with the legislation and not in accordance with the
perhaps differing concepts of some members of the CAB. The legisla-
tion establishes specific programs for increased competition. The legis-
lation also includes a new policy statement which gives the CAB broad
discretion to establish other programs to encourage competition, such
as the multiple permissive authority program recently established by
the Board. Such programs are needed in the gradual and phased tran-
sition to a deregulated system. However, we expect that in developing
these programs the Board will pay heed to the provisions of the policy




,6 International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-192,
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convenience and necessity, as it was under the Federal Avia-
tion Act of 1958.47 The Deregulation Act continued the transi-
tion toward deregulation by ending the CAB's regulatory
power over domestic passenger fares as of December 31,
1981,"1 and by providing for the dissolution of certain CAB
authority on January 1, 1985."9
The Deregulation Act also liberalized the procedure for ter-
minating air carrier service.50 Rather than applying to the
Board for permission, as required by the Federal Aviation Act
of 1958,5" an air carrier must simply notify the CAB, the com-
munity affected, and the affected state agency of its intent to
withdraw from a market.2 In recognition of the potentially
harmful effects of deregulation and withdrawal on small com-
munities, Congress has created a new program in section 419
94 STAT. 37 (1980) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 1371(d)(1) (Supp. IV 1980)
provides:
The Board shall issue a certificate authorizing the whole or any part of
the transportation covered by the application, if it finds that the appli-
cant is fit, willing, and able to perform such transportation properly
and to conform to the provisions of this Act and the rules, regulations,
and requirements of the Board hereunder, and that such transporta-
tion is consistent with the public convenience and necessity; otherwise
such application shall be denied.
Id.
17 § 401(d)(1), Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 STAT. 731 (1958) (current version 49 U.S.C.
§ 1371(d)(1) (1976)). See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
48 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 § 1601(a)(1)(F), Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 STAT.
1705 (1978) (Current version at 49 U.S.C. § 1551(a)(1)(F) (Supp. III 1979)).
49.U.S.C. § 1551(b)(2) (Supp. III 1979).
80 49 U.S.C. § 13710)(1) (Supp. III 1979) provides in part:
No air carrier holding a certificate issued under this section shall-
(A) terminate or suspend all air transportation which it is pro-
viding to a point under such certificate . . . unless such air car-
rier has first given the Board, any community affected, and the
State agency of the State in which the community is located, at
least 90 days notice of its intent to so terminate, suspend, or
reduce such air transportation. The Board may, by regulation or
otherwise, authorize such temporary suspension of service as
may be in the public interest.
Id.
51 Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 401(j), 49 U.S.C. § 1371(j) (1976). See supra note
35.
" Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 § 4010)(1), 49 U.S.C. § 1371(j)(1) (Supp. III
1979). See supra note 50.
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of the Deregulation Act,53 the Small Community Air Service
Program,5" designed to guarantee that small communities will
receive air service for up to ten years, at government expense
if necessary. 5 This program is to remain in effect until Octo-
ber 24, 1988.56
Section 419(a)(2) gives the CAB the power to determine
what constitutes essential air transportation in order to see if
a community fits within the scope of the Small Community
Air Service Program. The Deregulation Act allotted the CAB
one year from the time of passage to make an essential air
transportation determination for all communities not served
53 49 U.S.C. § 1389 (Supp. III 1979).
4 Id.
5 49 U.S.C. §§ 1389(a)(4)(B), 1389(a)(5) (Supp. III 1979). Section 419(a)(4)(B),
provides that "the Board shall establish, in accordance with the guidelines promul-
gated under subsection (d) of this section a rate of compensation to be paid for pro-
viding such essential air transportation." 49 U.S.C. § 1389(a)(4)(B) (Supp. III 1979)
Section 419(a)(5) provides:
The Board shall make payments of compensation under this section at
times and in a manner determined by the Baord to be appropriate.
The Board shall continue to pay compensation to any air carrier to
provide essential air transportation to an eligible point only for so long
as the board determines it is necessary in order to maintain essential
air transportation to such eligible point.
49 U.S.C. § 1389(a)(5) (Supp. III 1979).
" 49 U.S.C. § 1389(g) (Supp. III 1979) provides that "this section shall cease to be
in effect after the last day of the ten-year period which begins October 24, 1978."
During this ten year period, pursuant to section 419(b)(2), the authority to provide
compensation for air transportation to small communities is transferred from the
CAB to the Department of Transportation effective on January 1, 1985. 49 U.S.C. §
1551(b)(1)(A) (Supp. III 1979).
57 49 U.S.C. § 1389(a)(2) (Supp. III 1979). See supra note 25. Section 1389(f) de-
fines essential air transportation as:
[S]cheduled air transportation of persons to a point provided under
such criteria as the Board determines satisfies the needs of the com-
munity concerned for air transportation to one or more communities
of interest and insures access to the Nation's air transportation sys-
tem, at rates, fares, and charges which are not unjust, unreasonable,
unjustly discriminatory, unduly preferential, or unduly prejudicial,
and-
(1) with respect to air transportation to any point (other than in
the State of Alaska), in no case shall essential air transportation
be specified as fewer than two daily round trips, 5 days per
week, or the level of service provided by air carriers in effect for
calendar year 1977, whichever is less.
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or served by only one certified air carrier,58 and empowered
the CAB to make such determinations for communities that
subsequently receive notice of the termination of service by all
but one air carrier. 59
The other vital portion of the legislation is section 419(a)
(10). 60 This subsection allows the CAB, upon petition of an
appropriate party, to prohibit any downgrading of air service
by a certified air carrier until a determination of essential air
transportaion has been completed.61 The applicability of sec-
tion 419(a)(10) formed the major question of law in Delta Air
Lines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board.2
II. DELTA AIR LINES, INC. V. C.A.B.
In this case of first impression," the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals was faced with four issues of law. The initial
issue was whether the case was moot." The second issue was
whether the CAB had the authority to suspend Eastern's ter-
mination of service." The third issue was whether the CAB
had the authority to require Delta and Republic to give ninety
days notice of any reduction in service." The final issue was
whether the CAB had the authority to require Eastern, Delta
and Republic to make weekly passenger traffic reports. 7
A. Mootness
The threshold issue faced by the court was whether the sub-
stantive issues of law had been rendered moot by the CAB
terminating its orders. 8 The court agreed with Delta's posi-
tion that the legal issues were "capable of repetition, yet evad-
49 U.S.C. § 1389(a)(2)(A) (Supp. III 1979).
" 49 U.S.C. § 1389(a)(2)(B) (Supp. III 1979).
40 49 U.S.C. § 1389(a)(10) (Supp. III 1979). See supra note 17.
I d.
674 F.2d 1, 4-5 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
3 Id. at 2 n.3.
6, Id. at 4.
66 Id.
" Id. at 6.
67 Id.
6I Id. at 4.
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ing review" 69 and determined that the case was not moot."
Noting that the CAB had asserted the disputed authority
three times since enactment of the Deregulation Act,7 1 the
court reasoned that Delta might be subjected to the same type
of requirements again.
B. CAB Power to Prohibit Suspension of Service Under
Section 419(a)(10)
After reversing the CAB on the mootness issue,73 the court
dealt with the CAB's authority to postpone Eastern's suspen-
sion of service.74 The CAB had based such authority on sec-
tion 419(a)(10),7 5 arguing that the Congressional intent of the
section was to guarantee essential air transportation to "any
eligible point," including Montgomery,7 6 and that the essen-
tial air service program was not limited in scope to com-
munites fitting within the description contained in section
419(a)(2)." The CAB argued that because Congress did not
specifically limit section 419(a)(10) to those communities
fitting within section 419(a)(2), the CAB could suspend any
reduction of service to any community eligible to receive air
service until a determination of essential air service had been
"I Id. The court held that the case was not moot based on the doctrine that the
legal issues were "capable of repetition, yet evading review." This doctrine was first
pronounced by the Supreme Court in the case of Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v.
I.C.C., 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911), and was also used in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125
(1973). The court cited the case of United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633
(1953), in which the Supreme Court held that "the moving party must satisfy the
court that relief is needed. The necessary determination is that there exists some
cognizable danger of recurrent violation, something more than the mere possibility
which serves to keep the case alive." The court in Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. C.A.B. 674
F.2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1982) agreed with Delta's position that because of the short term
nature of the orders and the fact that the CAB had asserted the same disputed au-






78 49 U.S.C. § 1389(a)(10) (Supp. III 1979). See supra note 17.
71 Brief for Respondent, supra note 3, at 21.
77 Id. at 21-23. Communities that fit within the section 419(a)(2) category are those
"eligible communites" as described in section 419(a)(1) which are now receiving air
service from just one certified air carrier. 49 U.S.C. § 1389(a)(2) (Supp. III 1979).
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completed.7 8 The CAB stated that this was consistent with
Congressional intent, because Congress was concerned with
guaranteeing essential air service to all small communities
during the transition to deregulation.7
In opposition, Delta contended that although Montgomery
was an eligible point for air service as described by section
419(a)(1),80 the CAB was not authorized to make an essential
air service determination because Montgomery, serviced by
two certified air carriers, did not fit within section 419(a)(2).81
Delta argued that the CAB is specifically limited in making
essential air transportation determinations to communities
that fit within the latter section, and that, because Montgom-
ery was not included in that category, the CAB had no au-
thority to suspend Eastern's termination of service."
The court, in interpreting the language of section
419(a)(10), accepted Delta's argument as being the position
most consistent with Congress' intent to deregulate the air in-
dustry.as The court held that acceptance of the CAB's position
on this issue would subvert the goal of deregulation by al-
lowing the CAB to suspend termination of service to any com-
munity no matter how many remaining air carriers were serv-
ing it.8' The court acknowledged that some small communities
might suffer severe disruptions in service even though they
are still served by more than one air carrier,8 but held that in
view of the policy of deregulation, Congress intended to allow
7' Brief for Respondent, supra note 3 (cited in Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. C.A.B., 674
F.2d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
7, Brief for Respondent, supra note 3, at 24.
$0 49 U.S.C. § 1389(a)(1) (Supp. III 1979) defines an "eligible point" as,
any point in the United States to which, on October 24, 1978, any air
carrier-
(A) is providing service pursuant to a certificate issued to such
carrier under section 1371 of this title; or
(B) is authorized pursuant to such certificate to provide such
service, but such service is suspended on October 24, 1978.
Id.
8 Brief for Petitioner at 29, Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. C.A.B., 674 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
Id. at 31-32.
674 F.2d at 6.
Id. at 5-6.
Id. at 6.
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such disruptions, as evidenced by the language of section
419(a)(10).86 The court's rationale for this interpretation is
based on the incongruency between the CAB's position and
the overall goals of deregulation.8 7 If the CAB's view was to be
carried out to its logical extreme, the court stated that the
CAB could suspend any termination of service at any airport
eligible to receive air service, and still maintain service at pre-
sent levels by preventing exit from a market or subsidizing air
carriers to provide equivalent service.88
C. CAB Power to Require Ninety Days Notice of Any
Reduction of Service Under Section 401(j)
The third legal issue faced by the court was whether the
CAB had authority under section 401(j)8 of the Deregulation
Act to require Delta and Republic to give ninety days notice
of any reduction in service.90 As the CAB interpreted section
401(j), a formal essential air transportation determination was
not required to have been completed. Rather, the CAB had
the power to require air carriers to give ninety days notice of
any reduction in service during the period in which the CAB
was undertaking an essential air transportation determina-
tion." The CAB completed its argument by relying on section
419(a)(10) for authority to make an essential air transporta-
tion determination, thus giving it the power to require notice
of reductions in service in the interim period before the deter-
mination was completed.' 2
Delta based its argument solely on the fact that the CAB
had not made a determination of essential air transporta-
tion.93 Delta contended that the language of section 401(j) re-
quires that notice be given only when an air carrier is going to
reduce service "below that which the Board has determined to
Id.
e7 Id.
" Id. at 5-6.
49 U.S.C. § 1371(j)(1) (Supp. III 1979). See supra note 35.
" 674 F.2d at 6.
' Brief for Respondent, supra note 3, at 34.
" Id. at 34-35.
11 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 81 at 36.
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be essential air transportation for such a point.""4 Emphasiz-
ing that even if the CAB were empowered to require notice
during the period in which an essential air transportation de-
termination is being made, Delta argued that in this case the
CAB had no authority to require notice because it had no au-
thority to make an essential air transportation
determination."'
The court agreed with Delta's position. Section 401(j) re-
quires that there be a reduction in service below the point
which the CAB has determined to be essential air transporta-
tion before notice of a reduction in service is required.9 Tak-
ing notice of the fact that the CAB had not made an essential
air transportation determination," the court held that the
CAB had neither the power to make such a determination98
nor to require Delta to give notice of a reduction in service.9
D. CAB Power to Require Weekly Passenger Traffic
Reports
The final legal issue the court faced was whether the CAB
had the authority to require Delta to submit weekly reports
on passenger traffic to and from Montgomery. 100 The CAB is
empowered under section 407(a)101 to require air carriers to
file "special reports" and "specific answers to all questions
upon which the Board may deem information to be neces-
sary.' 1 02 The court held that although the CAB had no au-
thority to determine what constitutes essential air transporta-
tion for Montgomery, 03 the CAB did have the power to
require weekly passenger traffic reports under Section 407(a)
in preparation for a time when the CAB may have to make an
essential air transportation determination for Montgomery
9Id.
9& Id.





10- 49 U.S.C. § 1377(a) (Supp. III 1979). See supra note 19.
102 Id.
'0" 674 F.2d at 7.
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under section 419(a)(10). 104
III. CONCLUSION
The potential impact of Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. C.A.B. 10 5 is
substantial considering that the Small Community Essential
Air Transportation Program will be in effect until October 24,
1988,106 with the Department of Transportation assuming the
CAB's authority on January 1, 1985.107 Under this program,
the CAB and its successor have the authority to maintain
what are determined to be essential levels of air transporta-
tion for small communities within the scope of the program.
The CAB may take such action even at the cost of paying a
government subsidy to air carriers required under the pro-
gram to maintain service.106
The major effect of this case is to limit the applicability of
the program to communities served by only one air carrier, as
specified in section 419(a)(2) of the Deregulation Act. The
narrow scope of the program will give air carriers the neces-
sary flexibility to exit markets in response to competitive mar-
ket factors as Congress had envisioned.109 Had the court sub-
scribed to the CAB's interpretation of section 419(a)(10), the
Board could have prohibited the withdrawal of air carriers
from any market in the United States until the CAB had com-
pleted an essential air transportation determination, 10 and
could have maintained service at the level it determined to be
essential air transportation."' The impact of this possibility
cannot be overstated today in view of the increased price of
fuel which can turn once-profitable markets into financial
drains on air carriers. The potential for profits resulting from
shifts in service in response to market changes such as the
Braniff bankruptcy would also be greatly reduced if the CAB
04 Id.
108 674 F.2d 1 (D. C. Cir. 1982).
49 U.S.C. § 1389(g) (Supp. III 1979).
10" 49 U.S.C. § 1551(b)(2) (Supp. III 1979).
1- 49 U.S.C. § 1389(a)(5) (Supp. III 1979).
101 Conference Report, supra note 43, at 56.
110 See supra notes 74-88 and accompanying text.
I Id.
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were able to suspend any air carrier's withdrawal from any
domestic market. This circuit court decision will thus allow an
air carrier to determine where it can fly its airplanes most eco-
nomically and efficiently, except for that narrow range of mar-
kets which fall within the scope of the Small Community Es-
sential Air Transportation Program.
The court's ruling on the CAB's authority to require notice
before a reduction in service is also very important for air car-
riers. By not requiring 'ninety days notice of a reduction in
service, the court has greatly facilitated the airlines' ability to
react readily to market changes. Unless the air carrier is serv-
ing a small community which the CAB has previously deter-
mined to be essential air transportation, and service is re-
duced below levels established by the CAB, 1 airlines may
now reduce service without notice in certain locations in order
to increase operations in more profitable markets.
Daniel G. Yoe
"2 Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. C.A.B., 674 F.2d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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